The monograph provides coverage of an extensive history of Western thought by distinguishing two kinds of âlegal monstersâ: those as objects of legal regulations, as well as those as a source of criticism. The claim in this volume is twofold. On the one hand, drawing on the Roman lawâs notion of âmonstrum vel prodigiumâ, the assumption is that the formula should be considered as legally defunct nowadays. On the other, it represents a powerful metaphor of legal criticism insofar as it is supported by a strong philosophical framework and robust arguments from positive law. The bookâs analysis both provides this framework and makes it operational. The idea of âlegal monstersâ remains a powerful tool of criticism that, as handed down by a thousand-year-old tradition, demands attention even today. This is becoming all the more apparent in that there is no shortage of such legal cases. This volume appeals to students and researchers working in philosophy, law, and political science.